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{{Infobox Military Conflict|conflict=Falklands War|partof=|image=|caption=Map showing location of the Falkland Islands [1982 – 14 June 1982, [South Georgia and surrounding sea and airspace] military victory (status quo ante bellum), collapse of the National Reorganization Process led by dictator Leopoldo Galtieri|combatant2=
[United Kingdom
Vice-Admiral [Juan Lombardo
Brigadier-General Ernesto Horacio Crespo
Brigade-General Mario Menéndez [Margaret Thatcher
Admiral John Fieldhouse, Baron Fieldhouse
Rear-Admiral Sandy Woodward
Major-General Jeremy Moore
1 spy trawler|casualties2=258 killed Casualties of the Falklands War MOD website, retrieved 11 January 2006
777 wounded
115 taken prisoner
6 (Sea) Harriers
24 helicopters
2 destroyers
2 frigates
1 [Landing Ship Logistics landing ship
1 Landing Craft Utility amphibious craft
1 containership and the [United Kingdom over the disputed Falkland Islands, South Georgia and the South Sandwich Islands. The Falkland Islands consist of two large and many small islands in the South Atlantic Ocean east of Argentina, and their name and ownership have long been disputed. (See Sovereignty of the Falkland Islands for the background to the latter dispute.)

The war was triggered by the occupation of South Georgia by Argentina on 19 March 1982 followed by the occupation of the Falklands, and ended when Argentina surrendered on 14 June 1982. War was Declaration of war by either side. The initial invasion was considered by Argentina as the re-occupation of its own territory, and by united kingdom as an invasion of a British overseas territory, and the most recent invasion of British territory by a foreign power.

In the period leading up to the war, Argentina was in the midst of a devastating economy of Argentina crisis and large-scale civil unrest against the repressive military government Military dictatorship that had been governing the country since 1976. The Argentine military government, headed by General officer Leopoldo Galtieri, sought to maintain power by diverting public attention playing off long-standing feelings of the Argentines towards the islands,http://www.me.gov.ar/curriform/publica/sirlin_conv_dictadura.pdf Argentine Government although they never thought that the United Kingdom would respond militarily."" ("This was neither about national pride nor anything else.The military dictatorship —Galtieri told me— never believed the British would respond. He thought the West World had gone corrupted. That British people did not have God, that the US had gone corrupted… I could never convince him that the British would not only fight back but also win war.") The Sovereignty of the Falkland Islands over the islands increased on 19 March when a group of hired Argentinian scrap metal merchants raised their Flag of Argentina at South Georgia, an act that would later be seen as the first offensive action in the war. The Argentine Military Junta, suspecting that the UK would reinforce its South Atlantic Forces, En Buenos Aires, la Junta comenzó a estudiar la posibilidad de ocupar las Islas Malvinas y Georgias antes de que los británicos pudieran reforzarlas ordered the 1982 invasion of the Falkland Islands to be brought forward to 2 April.

Word of the invasion first reached Britain via ham radiohttp://news.bbc.co.uk/2/hi/uk_news/6514011.stm]. Britain was initially taken by surprise by the Argentine attack on the South Atlantic islands, but launched a naval task force to engage the Argentine Navy and Argentine Air Force, and retake the islands by amphibious warfare. After combat resulting in 258 British and 649 Argentine deaths, the British eventually prevailed and the islands remained under British control. However, as of 2007 Argentina for Falklands Sovereignty Prensa Latina Latin America New Agency accessed 21 June 2007 and as it has since the 19th century, Argentina shows no sign of relinquishing its claim (the claim is included in the Argentine constitution Constitución Nacional La Nación Argentina ratifica su legítima e imprescriptible soberanía sobre las Islas Malvinas, Georgias del Sur y Sandwich del Sur y los espacios marítimos e insulares correspondientes, por ser parte integrante del territorio nacional).

The political effects of the war were strong in both countries. A wave of patriotic sentiment swept through both: the Argentine loss prompted even larger protests against the military government, which hastened its downfall; in the United Kingdom, the government of Prime Minister of the United Kingdom Margaret Thatcher was bolstered. It helped Thatcher's government to victory in the United Kingdom general election, 1983, which prior to the war was seen as by no means certain. The war has played an important role in the culture of both countries, and has been the subject of several books, films, and songs. However, it is not seen as a truly major event of either military or 20th century history because of the low number of casualties on both sides and the small size and limited economic importance of the disputed areas. The cultural and political weight of the conflict has had less effect on the British public than on that of Argentina, where the war is still a topic of discussion.http://www.clarin.com/suplementos/zona/2007/04/01/z-03415.htm

Lead-up to the conflict See also: 1982 invasion of the Falkland Islands (The Argentine occupation of the Falklands Islands)

War By mid-April, the Royal Air Force had set up an RAF Ascension Island at Wideawake on the mid-Atlantic Ocean island of Ascension Island, including a sizable force of Avro Vulcan bombers, Handley Page Victor Tanker (aircraft), and F-4 Phantom Fighter aircraft to protect them. Meanwhile the main British naval task force arrived at Ascension to prepare for war. A small force had already been sent south to re-capture South Georgia.

Encounters began in April; the British Task Force was shadowed by Boeing 707 aircraft of the Argentine Air Force during their travel to the south. One of these flights was intercepted outside the British self-imposed exclusion zone, by a Sea Harrier; the unarmed 707 was not attacked because diplomatic moves were still in progress and the UK had not yet decided to commit itself to war.

Recapture of South Georgia and the attack on the Santa Fe The South Georgia force, Operation Paraquet, under the command of Major Guy Sheridan RM, consisted of Marines from 42 Commando Royal Marines, a troop of the Special Air Service (SAS) and Special Boat Service (SB Sqn) troops who were intended to land as reconnaissance forces for an invasion by the Royal Marines. All were embarked on RFA Tidespring. First to arrive was the Churchill class submarine HMS Conqueror (S48) on 19 April, and the island was over-flown by a radar-mapping Handley Page Victor on 20 April. The first landings of SAS troops took place on 21 April, but — with the southern hemisphere autumn setting in — the weather was so bad that their landings and others made the next day were all withdrawn after two helicopters crashed in fog on Fortuna Glacier. The first Royal Navy ship to arrive was the type 42 destroyer HMS Glasgow.

On 23 April, a submarine alert was sounded and operations were halted, with the Tidespring being withdrawn to deeper water to avoid interception. On 24 April, the British forces regrouped and headed in to attack the submarine. On 25 April the ARA Santa Fe (S-21) was spotted by a Westland Wessex helicopter from HMS Antrim (D18), which attacked the Argentine submarine with depth charges. HMS Plymouth (F126) launched a Westland Wasp helicopter, and HMS Brilliant (F90) launched a Westland Lynx. The Lynx launched a torpedo, and strafed it with its pintle-mounted L7 (machine gun); the Wessex also fired on the Santa Fe with its GPMG. The Wasp from HMS Plymouth as well as two other Wasps launched from HMS Endurance (1967) fired Aerospatiale AS-12 Air-to-surface missile anti-ship missile at the submarine, scoring hits. Santa Fe was damaged badly enough to prevent her from submerging. The crew abandoned the submarine at the jetty at King Edward Point on South Georgia.

With the Tidespring now far out to sea and the Argentine forces augmented by the submarine's crew, Major Sheridan decided to gather the 76 men he had and make a direct assault that day. After a short forced march by the British force, the Argentine forces surrendered without resistance. The message sent from the naval force at South Georgia to London was "Please inform Her Majesty, that the white ensign flies alongside the union flag on the isle of South Georgia. God save the queen".Prime Minister Thatcher broke the news to the media, telling them to "Just rejoice at that news!"

Black Buck raids The Operation Black Buck raids were a series of five attacks on the Islands by RAF Avro Vulcan bombers of No. 44 Squadron RAF, staged from Wideawake airbase on Ascension Island, close to the equator. The aircraft carried either 21 1,000 lb bombs internally or four AGM-45 Shrike anti-radar missiles externally. The overall effect of the raids on the war is difficult to determine, as the raids consumed precious tanker resources"..to get twenty-one bombs to Port Stanley is going to take about one million, one hundred thousand pounds of fuel - equalled about 137,000 gallons. That was enough fuel to fly 260 Sea Harrier bombing missions over Port Stanley. Which in turn meant just over 1300 bombs. Interesting stuff!" page 186 in Sharkey Ward: Sea Harrier over the Falklands, 1992, Cassell Military Paperbacks, ISBN 0-304-35542-9. The raids did minimal damage to the runway and damage to radars was quickly repaired. Post-war propaganda"Propaganda was, of course, used later to try to justify these missions: 'The Mirage IIIs were redrawn from Southern Argentina to Buenos Aires to add to the defences there following the Vulcan raids on the islands.' Apparently the logic behind this statement was that if the Vulcan could hit Port Stanley, the Buenos Aires was well within range as well and was vulnerable to similar attacks. I never went along with that baloney. A lone Vulcan or two running in to attack Buenos Aires without fighter support would have been shot to hell in quick time."-"Mirage IIIs were in evidence near the islands on several occasions during the conflict, either escorting the Neptune reconnaissance missions or on 'interference' flights that attempted to draw CAP attention away from air-to-ground attacks."-"Suffice it to say that you didn't need more than one or two Mirage IIIs to intercept a Vulcan attack on Buenos Aires"-"It would have taken much more than a lone Vulcan raid to upset Buenos Aires" pages 247-48 in Sea Harrier over the Falklands states that the Vulcan raids influenced Argentina to withdraw Mirage IIIs from the Southern Argentina to the Buenos Aires Defence Zone. It has been suggested that the Black Buck raids were pressed home by the Royal Air ForceSir Lawrence Freedman: Official History of the Falklands Campaign, 2005. The British armed forces had been cut in the late seventies, and the RAF may have desired a greater role in the conflict to prevent further cutsA.C.G.Welburn: The Application of False Principles and the Misapplication of Valid Principles page 25 in 'Australian Defence Force Journal No. 124 May/June 1997'. A single crater was produced on the runway, rendering it impossible for the airfield to be used by fast jetsMax Hastings, Simon Jenkins: The Battle for the Falklands (1983) ISBN 0393301982, p144. Argentine ground crew repaired the runwayEdward Fursdon: Falklands Aftermath, "The Argentinians had temporarily backfilled the five large craters, enabling them to continue to fly in C-130 Hercules transports" - the other craters were from Harrier raids; note that C-130 Hercules aircraft are designed to land on very rough semi-prepared airstrips. within twenty-four hours"And what was achieved? A crater in the runway that was filled in within twenty-four hours, and possibly a 30 mm gun radar knocked out." Sea Harrier over the Falklands and produced fake craters to confound British damage assessment"The photographs showed another bomb crater on Port Stanley airfield runway. This had been created by the Argentine Air Force unit who had begun to simulate bomb craters using bulldozers to build piles of mud which could be removed at night allowing aircraft to land." 16th May 1982 in http://www.navynews.co.uk/falklands/day_may.asp. The runway was also available for MB-339 Aermacchi jetsMax Hastings:"The Battle for the Falklands" on page 203 in the San Carlos chapter (21st May):"Meanwhile, a single Aeromacchi - almost certainly the first Fleet Air Arm (Argentine COAN) reconnaissance aircraft flying from Port Stanley - attacked the....".

On 1 May operations against the Falklands opened with the "Black Buck 1" attack on the airfield at Stanley. The Vulcan had originally been designed for medium-range stand-off nuclear missions in Europe and did not have the range to fly to the Falklands, requiring several in-flight refuellings. The RAF's tanker planes were mostly converted Handley Page Victor bombers with similar range, so they too had to be refuelled in the air. Thus, a total of 11 tankers were required for only two Vulcans, a huge logistics effort, given that both the tankers and bombers had to use the same strip. The attack yielded only a single hit on the runway.

The raids, at almost 8,000 nautical miles (13 000 km) and 16 hours for the return journey, were the longest-ranged bombing raids in history at that time (surpassed in the Persian Gulf War of 1991 by United States Air Force B-52 Stratofortress flying from the continental United States but using forward-positioned tankers). They are often credited with the strategic success of causing the Argentine Air Force ("Fuerza Aerea Argentina") to withdraw all their Dassault Mirage III aircraft to protect against the possibility of similar bombing raids on the Argentine mainland. However, according to the FAA version, Group 8 Mirages were deployed to Comodoro Rivadavia and Rio Gallegos in April (before the raids) where they remained until June to protect against any Chilean threat and as reserve for the strike units. Their lack of aerial refuel capability and a smaller internal fuel capacity, as compared to the IAI Daggers, prevented them from being used effectively over the islands, as was shown by their only engagement of the war on May 1, so they were relegated to mainland duties. Concerned about the possibility of Chilean strikes or Special Air Service raids, the FAA was forced to disperse its aircraft in the areas surrounding their southern airfields. For example, several parts of the national route #3 were used for this purpose. Commodore Ruben Oscar Moro La Guerra Inaudita, 2000 ISBN 987-96007-3-8

Only minutes after the RAF's Black Buck 1, nine Fleet Air Arm BAE Sea Harrier from HMS Hermes (R12) followed up the raid by dropping BL755 cluster bombs on Stanley and the smaller grass airstrip at Goose Green. The Harriers destroyed one FMA IA 58 Pucará at Goose Green and caused minor damage to Stanley airfield infrastructure. The remaining runways were fully operational through the rest of the conflict. Other Sea Harriers had taken off from the deck of HMS Invincible (R05) for combat air patrols, and although attached BBC reporter Brian Hanrahan was forbidden to divulge the number of planes involved, he came up with the memorable phrase "I counted them all out and I counted them all back." Gordon Smith, Battle Atlas of the Falklands War 1982 by Land, Sea and Air, lulu.com, 2006, URL retrieved 21 February 2007 Correspondent profile - bbc.co.uk, undated, retrieved on 21 February 2007

The Argentines nevertheless claimed that two Sea Harriers were downed that morning in the general area of Stanley. The Commander of the 10th Mechanized Infantry Brigade, Brigadier-General Oscar Jofre, gave the serial numbers of the two Sea Harriers as XZ 458 and XZ 491. Claiming the first to a 35 mm gun and the second to a Roland missile.the claim is made in his book La Defensa de Puerto Argentino - The Argentine Fight For The Falklands, Martin Middlebrook, pp.94-95 This claim has been dismissed by a number of English language sources...all blatant lies, designed to cover up the Argentine set backs of the day - The Argentine Fight For The Falklands, Martin Middlebrook, pp.94-95the Argentine claim that two Sea Harrier were shot down ... was patently fictitious - Falklands Air War, Chris Hobson and Andrew Noble

Of the five Black Buck raids, three were against Stanley Airfield, with the other two anti-radar missions using AGM-45 Shrike Air-to-surface missile Anti-radiation missile.

Escalation of the air war BAE Sea Harrier . This aircraft's predecessor, the FRS1, participated during the conflict.

The Falklands had only three airfields. The longest and only paved runway was at the capital, Stanley, Falkland Islands, and even it was too short to support fast jets. Therefore, the Argentine Air Force (FAA) was forced to launch its major strikes from the mainland, severely hampering its efforts at forward staging, combat air patrols and close air support over the islands. The effective loiter time of incoming Argentine aircraft was low, and they were later compelled to overfly British forces in any attempt to attack the islands.

The first major Argentine strike force comprised 36 aircraft (A-4 Skyhawk, IAI Nesher, English Electric Canberra and Dassault Mirage III escorts), and was sent on 1 May, in the belief that the British invasion was imminent or landings had already taken place. Only a section of Grupo 6 (flying IAI Dagger aircraft) found ships, which were firing at Argentine defences near the islands. The Daggers managed to attack the ships and return safely. This greatly boosted morale of the Argentine pilots, who now knew they could survive an attack against modern warships, protected by radar ground clutter from the Islands and by using a late pop-up profile.

Meanwhile, other Argentine aircraft were intercepted by Sea Harriers operating from HMS Invincible (R05). A Dagger and a Canberra were shot down.

Mirage IIIEA. Their lack of aerial refuelling capability prevented them from being used effectively over the islands in the air-air role.Combat broke out between Sea Harrier FRS Mk 1 fighters of No. 801 Naval Air Squadron and Dassault Mirage III fighters of Grupo 8. Both sides refused to fight at the other's best altitude, until two Mirages finally descended to engage. One was shot down by an AIM-9 air-to-air missile (AAM), while the other escaped but without enough fuel to return to its mainland airfield. The plane made for Stanley, where it fell victim to friendly fire from the Argentine defenders.

As a result of this experience, Argentine Air Force staff decided to employ A-4 Skyhawks and Daggers only as strike units, the Canberras only during the night, and Mirage IIIs (without air refuelling capability or any capable AAM) as decoys to lure away the British Sea Harriers. The decoying would be later extended with the formation of the Escuadron Fenix, a squadron of civilian jets flying 24 hours-a-day simulating strike aircraft preparing to attack the fleet. On one of these flights, an Air Force Learjet was shot down, killing the squadron commander, Vice Commodore Rodolfo De La Colina, who was the highest-ranking Argentine officer to die in the War.

Stanley was used as an Argentine strongpoint throughout the conflict. Despite the Black Buck and Harrier raids on Stanley airfield (no fast jets were stationed there for air defence) and overnight shelling by detached ships, it was never out of action entirely. Stanley was defended by a mixture of Surface-to-air missile (SAM) systems such as the Franco-German Roland (air defence)) and Swiss-built 35 mm twin anti-aircraft cannons. C-130 Hercules transport night flights brought supplies, weapons, vehicles, and fuel, and airlifted out the wounded up until the end of the conflict. The few RN Sea Harriers were considered too valuable by day to risk in night-time blockade operations, and their Blue Fox radar was not an effective look-down over land radar. The only Argentine Air Force Hercules shot down by the British was lost on 1 June when TC-63 was intercepted by a Sea Harrier in daylight when it was searching for the British fleet north-east of the islands after the Argentine Navy retired its last P-2 Neptune due to airframe attrition.

Sinking of Belgrano

Two separate British naval task forces (surface vessels and submarines) and the Argentine fleet were operating in the neighbourhood of the Falklands, and soon came into conflict. The first naval loss was the World War II vintage Argentine light cruiser ARA General Belgrano — formerly the USS Phoenix (CL-46), a survivor of the 1941 attack on Pearl Harbor. The Nuclear power submarine HMS Conqueror (S48), captained by Commander Christopher Wreford-Brown, sank Belgrano on May 2 using List of torpedoes torpedoes of WWII-vintage design; these were chosen as they carried a larger warhead and contact fuses and there were worries surrounding the reliability of the newer Mk 24 torpedo stock. Three hundred and twenty-three members of Belgrano's crew died in the incident. Over 700 men were rescued from the open ocean despite cold seas and stormy weather. Losses from Belgrano totalled just over half of Argentine deaths in the Falklands conflict, and the Belgrano remains the only ship ever sunk by a nuclear submarine in combat.

In a separate incident later that night, British forces engaged an Argentine patrol gunboat, the USS Salish (ATA-187). At the time, the Alferez Sobral was searching for the crew of the Argentine Air Force English Electric Canberra light bomber shot down on May 1. Two Westland Lynxes fired four Sea Skua missiles against her. Badly damaged and with eight crew dead, the Sobral managed to return to Puerto Deseado two days later, but the Canberra's crew were never found.

Initial reports conflated the two incidents, contributing to confusion about the number of casualties and the identity of the vessel that sank. The Rupert Murdoch-owned British tabloid newspaper The Sun (newspaper) greeted the initial reports of the attack with the headline "GOTCHA". This first edition was published before news was known that the Belgrano had actually sunk (reporting instead, erroneously, that the gunboat had sunk) and carried no reports of actual Argentine deaths. The headline was replaced in later editions by the more tempered "Did 1,200 Argies drown?".

The loss of ARA General Belgrano hardened the stance of the Argentine government and also became a cause célèbre for anti-war campaigners (such as Labour MP Tam Dalyell), who declared that the ship had been sailing away from the Falklands at the time. The vessel was outside the exclusion zone, and sailing away from the area of conflict. However, during war, under international law, the heading of a belligerent naval vessel has no bearing on its status. In addition, the captain of the Belgrano, Hector Bonzo, has testified that the attack was legitimate.http://news.independent.co.uk/uk/politics/story.jsp?story=476472http://www.ladlass.com/intel/archives/006479.html In later years it has been claimed that the information on the position of the ARA General Belgrano came from a Soviet spy satellite which was tapped by the Military of Norway intelligence service station at Fauske, Norway, and then handed over to the British. However, Conqueror had been shadowing the Belgrano for some days, so this extra information would have been unnecessary.http://www.nrk.no/programmer/tv/brennpunkt/1861285.html article about the Fauske II station (in Norwegian)

The sinking occurred 14 hours after List of Presidents of Peru Fernando Belaúnde Terry had proposed a comprehensive peace plan and called for regional unity. With the comprehensive failure of diplomatic efforts to that point and so without any hope that additional diplomatic efforts would lead anywhere, and with the knowledge that the delay that would be incurred by such efforts would eliminate the military option due to the closing winter weather, this plan was not entertained by the UK.

Regardless of controversies over the sinking, it had a crucial strategic effect: the elimination of the Argentine naval threat. After her loss, the entire Argentine fleet returned to port and did not leave again for the duration of hostilities. The two escorting destroyers and the battle group centred on the aircraft carrier ARA Veinticinco de Mayo both withdrew from the area, ending the direct threat to the British fleet that their pincer movement had represented. The attack on Belgrano was the first kill made by a nuclear submarine and only the second submarine kill since the end of the World War II, the other being made by PNS Hangor, a diesel electric submarine during the Indo-Pakistan War of 1971.

British historian Sir Lawrence Freedman stated in the second volume of his Official History of the Falklands that intelligence about the Belgrano did not reach senior British commanders and politicians until the order to sink her was passed. Thatcher in dark on Belgrano sinking Commander Christopher Wreford-Brown, commanding officer of HMS Conqueror, informed the Admiralty four hours before his attack that the Argentine cruiser had changed course, but this information was not passed to the Ministry of Defence (United Kingdom) or Rear-Admiral John “Sandy” Woodward (commander of the RN task force). However, as Admiral Woodward later stated, the Belgrano's course and speed at the time she was sunk were irrelevant - from a strategic point of view, only her position and capabilities mattered.

Sinking of HMS Sheffield of the Argentine Navy.

Two days after the sinking of Belgrano, on May 2, the British lost the Type 42 destroyer HMS Sheffield (D80) to fire following an Exocet missile strike. Sheffield had been ordered forward with two other Type 42s in order to provide a long-range radar and medium-high altitude missile "picket" far from the British carriers. After the ships were detected by an Argentine Navy P-2 Neptune patrol aircraft, two Dassault Super Étendards (serial no. 202 and 203) were launched from their base at Río Grande, Tierra del Fuego, each armed with a single Exocet AM39 missile. Refuelled by an Argentine Air Force C-130 Hercules after launch, they went in at low altitude, popped up for a radar check at 50 miles (80 km) and released the missiles from 20 to 30 miles (30 to 50 km) away.

HMS Glasgow, Sheffield’s sister ship and the northernmost of the three-destroyer picket, detected the two Étendards on their first pop-up, and warned the fleet-wide anti-air warfare coordinator in Hermes. Hermes dismissed the report as one of the many false alarms already that morning. Glasgow continued to monitor that bearing and detected the second pop-up, and this time the tell-tale Exocet seeker radar via the ship's electronic warfare support measures equipment. Again Hermes ruled the detection as spurious, but Glasgow continued to broadcast handbrake, the codeword for Exocet radar detected.

The first missile missed HMS Yarmouth (F101), due to her deployment of Chaff (radar countermeasure) in response to the warning, whilst Glasgow repeatedly tried, without success, to engage the other with Sea Dart missiles. Still Hermes ruled that this was a false alarm.

Sheffield was unable to detect directly the seeker radar as, in a case of bad timing, the SCOT satellite communications terminal was in use which deafened the onboard electronic warfare support measures (ESM) equipment. She did not detect the missile on radar due to her radar being of a similar frequency to that of the Exocet. It is not known why she did not respond to Glasgow's warnings, but no chaff was fired and a shipwide warning of attack went out only seconds before impact when a watchkeeper (Lieutenant Commander Peter Walpole) identified rocket trails visually.

Sheffield was struck amidships, with devastating effect. Whether the warhead actually exploded is debated, but raging fires started to spread, ultimately killing 20 crew members and severely injuring 24 others. Whilst alongside rendering assistance, Yarmouth repeatedly broke off to fire anti-submarine weaponry in response to Sonar reports of torpedoes in the water (later believed to have been a misdiagnosis of the outboard motor of the small inflatables helping with firefighting), as well as visual reports of torpedoes (in actual fact the Sheffield was ridding herself of torpedoes to prevent explosion).

Sheffield was abandoned several hours later, gutted and deformed by the fires that continued to burn for six more days. She finally sank outside the Maritime Exclusion Zone on May 10, whilst under tow from Yarmouth, becoming an official war grave. In one sense Sheffield served her purpose as a part of the missile picket line — she took the missile instead of the aircraft carriers.

The tempo of operations increased throughout the second half of May as United Nations attempts to mediate a peace were rejected by the British, who felt that any delay would make a campaign impractical in the South Atlantic storms. The destruction of Sheffield had a profound impact on the British public, bringing home the fact that the "Falklands Crisis", as the BBC News put it, was now an actual 'shooting war'.

SAS operations

Given the threat to the British fleet posed by the Etendard / Exocet combination, plans were made to use Special Air Service troops to attack the home base of the five Etendards at Río Grande, Tierra del Fuego. The aim was to destroy the missiles and the aircraft that carried them, and to kill the pilots in their quarters. Two plans were drafted and underwent preliminary rehearsal: a landing by approximately fifty-five SAS in two C-130 Hercules aircraft directly on the runway at Rio Grande; and infiltration of twenty-four SAS by inflatable boats brought within a few miles of the coast by submarine. Neither plan was implemented; the earlier airborne assault plan attracted considerable hostility from some members of the SAS, who considered the proposed raid a suicide mission.telegraph.co.uk SAS 'suicide mission' to wipe out Exocets Ironically, the Rio Grande area would be defended by four full-strength battalions of Marine Infantry of the Argentine Marine Corps of the Argentine Navy, some of whose officers were trained in the UK by Special Boat Service years earlier.Middlebrook, The Argentine Fight for the Falklnds p. 75After the war, Argentine marine commanders admitted that they were waiting for some kind of landing by SAS forces but never expected a Hercules to land directly on their runways, although they would have pursued British forces even into Chilean territory if they were attacked.La Infantería de Marina de la Armada Argentina en el Conflicto del Atlántico Sur, ISBN 987-433-641-2

A SAS reconnaissance team was dispatched to carry out preparations for a seaborne infiltration. A Westland Sea King helicopter carrying the assigned team took off from HMS Invincible on the night of May 17, but bad weather forced it to land 50 miles (80 km) from its target, and the mission was aborted.http://www.timesonline.co.uk/newspaper/0,,170-1670775,00.html The pilot flew to Chile and dropped off the SAS team, before setting fire to his helicopter and surrendering to the Chilean authorities. The discovery of the burnt-out helicopter attracted considerable international attention at the time.

On May 14, the SAS carried out the raid on Pebble Island at the Falklands, where the Argentine Navy had taken over a grass airfield for FMA IA 58 Pucará light ground attack aircraft and T-34 Mentors. The raid destroyed the aircraft there.

Landing at San Carlos — Bomb Alley

During the night on May 21, the British Amphibious Task Group under the command of Commodore Michael Clapp landed on beaches around San Carlos Water, on the northwestern coast of East Falkland facing onto Falkland Sound. The bay, known as Bomb Alley by British forces, was the scene of repeated air attacks by low-flying Argentine jets. Bomb Alley — Falklands Island 1982. Charles ends Falklands tour on sombre note, BBC News.

The 4,000 men of 3 Commando Brigade were put ashore as follows: 2nd battalion of the Parachute Regiment (2 Para) from the RORO ferry Norland and 40 Commando (Royal Marines) from the amphibious ship HMS Fearless (L10) were landed at San Carlos (Blue Beach), 3 Para from the amphibious ship HMS Intrepid (L11) were landed at Port San Carlos (Green Beach) and 45 Commando from RFA Stromness (A344) were landed at Ajax Bay (Red Beach). Notably the waves of 8 Landing Craft Utilitys and 8 LCVPs were led by Major Ewen Southby-Tailyour who had commanded the Falklands detachment only a year previously. 42 Commando on the liner SS Canberra was a tactical reserve. Units from the Royal Artillery, Royal Engineers etc. and tanks were also put ashore with the landing craft, the Round Table class landing ship logistics Landing Ship Logistics and mexefloat barges. Rapier missile launchers were carried as underslung loads of Westland Sea Kings for rapid deployment.


By dawn the next day they had established a secure beachhead from which to conduct offensive operations. From there Julian Thompson's plan was to capture Darwin, Falkland Islands and Goose Green before turning towards Port Stanley.Now, with the British troops on the ground, the Argentine Air Force began the night bombing campaign against them using English Electric Canberra bomber planes until the last day of the war (June 14).

At sea, the paucity of the British ships' anti-aircraft defences was demonstrated in the sinking of HMS Ardent (F184) on May 21, HMS Antelope (F170) on May 21, and MV Atlantic Conveyor, with a vital cargo of helicopters, runway-building equipment and tents on May 25. The loss of all but one of the RAF Chinook helicopters being carried by the Atlantic Conveyor was a severe blow from a logistics perspective. Also lost on this day was HMS Coventry (D118), a sister to HMS Sheffield (D80), whilst in company with HMS Broadsword (F88) after being ordered to act as decoy to draw away Argentinian aircraft from other ships at San Carlos Bay.Captain Hart Dyke, Commanding Officer of HMS Coventry HMS Argonaut (F56) and HMS Brilliant (F90) were badly damaged. However, many British ships escaped terminal damage because of the Argentine pilots' bombing tactics. In order to avoid the highest concentration of British air defences, Argentine pilots were forced to release ordnance from very low altitude, consequently their bomb fuses did not have time to arm before impact.

A-4C A-4 Skyhawk flying to the islands. Notice the 1000 lb General-purpose bomb

While the attacks were undoubtedly brave, the low release of the unretarded General-purpose bomb (some of which were sold to the Argentine FAA by the British years earlier) meant that many never exploded as there was insufficient time in the air for them to arm themselves. Simple free-fall bombs will, at low altitude, impact almost directly below the dropping aircraft, therefore there is a minimum safe altitude for release. The pilots would doubtless have been aware of this, but in the heat of Bomb Alley (the pilots need to avoid a high concentration of anti-aircraft defences of SAMs and Anti-Aircraft Artillery plus the Sea Harriers' CAPs) many failed to climb to the necessary release point. The problem was solved by the improvised fitting of Gravity bomb, allowing low-level bombing attacks as employed on June 8.

In his autobiographical account of the Falklands War, Admiral Woodward blames the BBC World Service for these changes to the bombs. The World Service reported the lack of detonations after receiving a briefing on the matter from an Ministry of Defence (United Kingdom) official. He describes the BBC as being more concerned with being "fearless seekers after truth" than with the lives of British servicemen. Colonel H. Jones levelled similar accusations against the BBC after they disclosed the impending British attack on Goose Green by The Parachute Regiment. Jones had threatened to lead the prosecution of senior BBC officials for treason but was unable to do so since he was himself killed in action around Goose Green.

Thirteen bombs Battle Atlas of the Falklands War 1982 — British ships lost & damaged. hit British ships without detonating. David Craig, Baron Craig of Radley, the former Marshal of the Royal Air Force, is said to have remarked: “Six better fuses and we would have lost” Scotsman. although Ardent and Antelope were both lost despite the failure of bombs to explode. The fuses were functioning correctly, and the bombs were simply released from too low an altitude. Royal Navy.

The Argentines lost nearly twenty aircraft in these attacks.

Battle of Goose Green From early on 27 May until 28 May, 2 Para, (approximately 500 men) with Artillery support from 8 Alma Cdo Bty, approached and attacked Darwin, Falkland Islands and Goose Green, which was held by the Argentine 12th Inf Regt. After a tough struggle which lasted all night and into the next day, 17 British and 55 Argentine soldiers had been killed, and 1,050 Argentine troops (including around 350 FAA non-combatant personnel of the Condor airfield Commodore Ruben Oscar Moro La Guerra Inaudita, 2000 ISBN 987-96007-3-8) taken prisoner. The BBC announced the taking of Goose Green on the BBC World Service before it had actually happened. It was during this attack that Lieutenant Colonel H. Jones, the commanding officer of 2 Para was killed. He was posthumously awarded the Victoria Cross.



With the sizeable Argentine force at Goose Green out of the way, British forces were now able to break out of the San Carlos, Falkland Islands bridgehead. On 27 May, men of 45 Cdo and 3 Para started walking across East Falkland towards the coastal settlement of Teal Inlet.

Special forces on Mount Kent Meanwhile, 42 Commando prepared to move by helicopter to Mount Kent. Unknown to senior British officers, the Argentine generals were determined to tie down the British troops in the Mount Kent area, and on 27 May and 28 May they sent transport aircraft loaded with Blowpipe surface-to-air missiles and commandos (602nd Commando Company and 601st National Gendarmerie Special Forces Squadron) to Stanley, Falkland Islands. This operation was known as Operation AUTOIMPUESTA (Self-Determination-Initiative). For the next week, the Special Air Service (SAS) and Mountain Leader Training Cadre of 3 Commando Brigade waged intense patrol battles with patrols of the volunteers' 602nd Commando Company under Major Aldo Rico, normally 2IC of the 22nd Mountain Infantry Regiment. Throughout 30 May, Royal Air Force Harriers were active over Mount Kent. One of them — Harrier XZ 963 flown by Squadron-Leader Jerry Pook — in responding to a call for help from D Squadron, attacked Mount Kent's eastern lower slopes, and that led to its loss through small-arms fire.

On the 31 May, the Royal Marines Mountain Leader Training Cadre (M&AWC) defeated Argentine Special Forces at the Battle of Top Malo House. A 13-strong Argentine Army Commando detachment (Captain Jose Vercesi's 1st Assault Section, 602nd Commando Company) found itself trapped in a small shepherd's house at Top Malo. The Argentine commandos fired from windows and doorways and then took refuge in a stream bed from the burning house. Completely surrounded, they fought 19 M&AWC marines under Captain Rod Boswell for forty-five minutes until, with their ammunition almost exhausted, they elected to surrender. Three Cadre members were badly wounded. On the Argentine side there were two dead including Lieutenant Ernesto Espinoza and Sergeant Mateo Sbert (who were decorated for their bravery). Only five Argentines were left unscathed. As the British mopped up Top Malo House, down from Malo Hill came Lieutenant Fraser Haddow's M&AWC patrol, brandishing a large Union Flag. One wounded Argentine soldier, Lieutenant Horacio Losito, commented that their escape route would have taken them through Haddow's position.

It is estimated that 40 Argentine Commandos were involved in the battle with the SAS and the Cadre at Top Malo House and Mount Kent. A body count revealed four bullet-ridden Argentine Army 602nd Commando Company killed in the firefights. Seven members of the British Special Forces were wounded during these actions. One Special Boat Service sergeant was killed in a blue on blue engagement by an SAS patrol.

Major Mario Castagneto's commanding the 601st Commando Company attempted to move forward on their Kawasaki motorbikes and commandeered Land Rover Series to rescue 602nd Commando Company on Estancia Mountain. Spotted by 42 Commando of the Royal Marines, they were engaged with L16 81 mm Mortar and forced to withdraw to Two Sisters mountain. Captain Eduardo Villarruel on Estancia Mountain realised his position had become untenable and after conferring with fellow officers ordered a withdrawal. David Aldea, The Argentine Commandos on Mount Kent

The Argentine operation also saw the extensive use of helicopter support to position and extract patrols; the Argentine Army 601st Combat Aviation Battalion also suffered casualties. At about 11.00 a.m. on 30 May, an Aérospatiale Puma helicopter was brought down by a shoulder-launched stinger missile surface-to-air missile (SAM) fired by the Special air service in the vicinity of Mount Kent in which six Gendarmeria Nacional Argentina Special Forces were killed and eight more wounded in the crash.

As Brigadier Julian Thompson commented, "It was fortunate that I had ignored the views expressed by Northwood that reconnaissance of Mount Kent before insertion of 42 Commando was superfluous. Had D Squadron not been there, the Argentine Special Forces would have caught the Commando before deplaning and, in the darkness and confusion on a strange landing zone, inflicted heavy casualties on men and helicopters."Julian Thompson, No Picnic, p. 93, Casssell & Co, 2001

Bluff Cove and Fitzroy By June 1, with the arrival of a further 5,000 British troops of the 5th Infantry Brigade, the new British divisional commander, Major General Jeremy Moore RM, had sufficient force to start planning an offensive against Stanley, Falkland Islands.

During this build-up, the Argentine air assaults on the British naval forces continued, killing 56. 32 of the dead were from the Welsh Guards on RFA Sir Galahad (1966) and RFA Sir Tristram (L3505) on June 8. According to Surgeon-Commander Rick Jolly of the Falklands Field Hospital, more than 150 men suffered burns and injuries of some kind in the attack, including, famously, Simon Weston.Rick Jolly, The Red & Green Life Machine, page 124

The Guards were sent to support a dashing advance along the southern approach to Stanley. On 2 June, a small advance party of 2 Para moved to Swan Inlet house in a number of Army Westland Scout helicopters. Telephoning ahead to Fitzroy, they discovered the area clear of Argentines and (exceeding their authority) commandeered the one remaining RAF Chinook helicopter to frantically ferry another contingent of 2 Para ahead to Fitzroy, Falkland Islands (a settlement on Port Pleasant) and Bluff Cove (a settlement confusingly, and perhaps ultimately fatally, on Port Fitzroy).

This un-coordinated advance caused planning nightmares for the commanders of the combined operation, as they now found themselves with a 30 mile (48 km) string of indefensible positions on their southern flank. Support could not be sent by air as the single remaining Chinook was already heavily oversubscribed. The soldiers could march, but their equipment and heavy supplies would need to be ferried by sea. Plans were drawn up for half the Welsh Guards to march light on the night of 2 June, whilst the Scots Guards and the second half of the Welsh Guards were to be ferried from San Carlos Water in the Landing Ship Logistics (LSL) Sir Tristram and the {{Infobox Military Conflict|conflict=Falklands War|partof=|image=|caption=Map showing location of the Falkland Islands [1982 – 14 June 1982, [South Georgia and surrounding sea and airspace] military victory (status quo ante bellum), collapse of the National Reorganization Process led by dictator Leopoldo Galtieri|combatant2=
[United Kingdom
Vice-Admiral [Juan Lombardo
Brigadier-General Ernesto Horacio Crespo
Brigade-General Mario Menéndez [Margaret Thatcher
Admiral John Fieldhouse, Baron Fieldhouse
Rear-Admiral Sandy Woodward
Major-General Jeremy Moore
1 spy trawler|casualties2=258 killed Casualties of the Falklands War MOD website, retrieved 11 January 2006
777 wounded
115 taken prisoner
6 (Sea) Harriers
24 helicopters
2 destroyers
2 frigates
1 [Landing Ship Logistics landing ship
1 Landing Craft Utility amphibious craft
1 containership and the [United Kingdom over the disputed Falkland Islands, South Georgia and the South Sandwich Islands. The Falkland Islands consist of two large and many small islands in the South Atlantic Ocean east of Argentina, and their name and ownership have long been disputed. (See Sovereignty of the Falkland Islands for the background to the latter dispute.)

The war was triggered by the occupation of South Georgia by Argentina on 19 March 1982 followed by the occupation of the Falklands, and ended when Argentina surrendered on 14 June 1982. War was Declaration of war by either side. The initial invasion was considered by Argentina as the re-occupation of its own territory, and by united kingdom as an invasion of a British overseas territory, and the most recent invasion of British territory by a foreign power.

In the period leading up to the war, Argentina was in the midst of a devastating economy of Argentina crisis and large-scale civil unrest against the repressive military government Military dictatorship that had been governing the country since 1976. The Argentine military government, headed by General officer Leopoldo Galtieri, sought to maintain power by diverting public attention playing off long-standing feelings of the Argentines towards the islands,http://www.me.gov.ar/curriform/publica/sirlin_conv_dictadura.pdf Argentine Government although they never thought that the United Kingdom would respond militarily."" ("This was neither about national pride nor anything else.The military dictatorship —Galtieri told me— never believed the British would respond. He thought the West World had gone corrupted. That British people did not have God, that the US had gone corrupted… I could never convince him that the British would not only fight back but also win war.") The Sovereignty of the Falkland Islands over the islands increased on 19 March when a group of hired Argentinian scrap metal merchants raised their Flag of Argentina at South Georgia, an act that would later be seen as the first offensive action in the war. The Argentine Military Junta, suspecting that the UK would reinforce its South Atlantic Forces, En Buenos Aires, la Junta comenzó a estudiar la posibilidad de ocupar las Islas Malvinas y Georgias antes de que los británicos pudieran reforzarlas ordered the 1982 invasion of the Falkland Islands to be brought forward to 2 April.

Word of the invasion first reached Britain via ham radiohttp://news.bbc.co.uk/2/hi/uk_news/6514011.stm]. Britain was initially taken by surprise by the Argentine attack on the South Atlantic islands, but launched a naval task force to engage the Argentine Navy and Argentine Air Force, and retake the islands by amphibious warfare. After combat resulting in 258 British and 649 Argentine deaths, the British eventually prevailed and the islands remained under British control. However, as of 2007 Argentina for Falklands Sovereignty Prensa Latina Latin America New Agency accessed 21 June 2007 and as it has since the 19th century, Argentina shows no sign of relinquishing its claim (the claim is included in the Argentine constitution Constitución Nacional La Nación Argentina ratifica su legítima e imprescriptible soberanía sobre las Islas Malvinas, Georgias del Sur y Sandwich del Sur y los espacios marítimos e insulares correspondientes, por ser parte integrante del territorio nacional).

The political effects of the war were strong in both countries. A wave of patriotic sentiment swept through both: the Argentine loss prompted even larger protests against the military government, which hastened its downfall; in the United Kingdom, the government of Prime Minister of the United Kingdom Margaret Thatcher was bolstered. It helped Thatcher's government to victory in the United Kingdom general election, 1983, which prior to the war was seen as by no means certain. The war has played an important role in the culture of both countries, and has been the subject of several books, films, and songs. However, it is not seen as a truly major event of either military or 20th century history because of the low number of casualties on both sides and the small size and limited economic importance of the disputed areas. The cultural and political weight of the conflict has had less effect on the British public than on that of Argentina, where the war is still a topic of discussion.http://www.clarin.com/suplementos/zona/2007/04/01/z-03415.htm

Lead-up to the conflict See also: 1982 invasion of the Falkland Islands (The Argentine occupation of the Falklands Islands)

War By mid-April, the Royal Air Force had set up an RAF Ascension Island at Wideawake on the mid-Atlantic Ocean island of Ascension Island, including a sizable force of Avro Vulcan bombers, Handley Page Victor Tanker (aircraft), and F-4 Phantom Fighter aircraft to protect them. Meanwhile the main British naval task force arrived at Ascension to prepare for war. A small force had already been sent south to re-capture South Georgia.

Encounters began in April; the British Task Force was shadowed by Boeing 707 aircraft of the Argentine Air Force during their travel to the south. One of these flights was intercepted outside the British self-imposed exclusion zone, by a Sea Harrier; the unarmed 707 was not attacked because diplomatic moves were still in progress and the UK had not yet decided to commit itself to war.

Recapture of South Georgia and the attack on the Santa Fe The South Georgia force, Operation Paraquet, under the command of Major Guy Sheridan RM, consisted of Marines from 42 Commando Royal Marines, a troop of the Special Air Service (SAS) and Special Boat Service (SB Sqn) troops who were intended to land as reconnaissance forces for an invasion by the Royal Marines. All were embarked on RFA Tidespring. First to arrive was the Churchill class submarine HMS Conqueror (S48) on 19 April, and the island was over-flown by a radar-mapping Handley Page Victor on 20 April. The first landings of SAS troops took place on 21 April, but — with the southern hemisphere autumn setting in — the weather was so bad that their landings and others made the next day were all withdrawn after two helicopters crashed in fog on Fortuna Glacier. The first Royal Navy ship to arrive was the type 42 destroyer HMS Glasgow.

On 23 April, a submarine alert was sounded and operations were halted, with the Tidespring being withdrawn to deeper water to avoid interception. On 24 April, the British forces regrouped and headed in to attack the submarine. On 25 April the ARA Santa Fe (S-21) was spotted by a Westland Wessex helicopter from HMS Antrim (D18), which attacked the Argentine submarine with depth charges. HMS Plymouth (F126) launched a Westland Wasp helicopter, and HMS Brilliant (F90) launched a Westland Lynx. The Lynx launched a torpedo, and strafed it with its pintle-mounted L7 (machine gun); the Wessex also fired on the Santa Fe with its GPMG. The Wasp from HMS Plymouth as well as two other Wasps launched from HMS Endurance (1967) fired Aerospatiale AS-12 Air-to-surface missile anti-ship missile at the submarine, scoring hits. Santa Fe was damaged badly enough to prevent her from submerging. The crew abandoned the submarine at the jetty at King Edward Point on South Georgia.

With the Tidespring now far out to sea and the Argentine forces augmented by the submarine's crew, Major Sheridan decided to gather the 76 men he had and make a direct assault that day. After a short forced march by the British force, the Argentine forces surrendered without resistance. The message sent from the naval force at South Georgia to London was "Please inform Her Majesty, that the white ensign flies alongside the union flag on the isle of South Georgia. God save the queen".Prime Minister Thatcher broke the news to the media, telling them to "Just rejoice at that news!"

Black Buck raids The Operation Black Buck raids were a series of five attacks on the Islands by RAF Avro Vulcan bombers of No. 44 Squadron RAF, staged from Wideawake airbase on Ascension Island, close to the equator. The aircraft carried either 21 1,000 lb bombs internally or four AGM-45 Shrike anti-radar missiles externally. The overall effect of the raids on the war is difficult to determine, as the raids consumed precious tanker resources"..to get twenty-one bombs to Port Stanley is going to take about one million, one hundred thousand pounds of fuel - equalled about 137,000 gallons. That was enough fuel to fly 260 Sea Harrier bombing missions over Port Stanley. Which in turn meant just over 1300 bombs. Interesting stuff!" page 186 in Sharkey Ward: Sea Harrier over the Falklands, 1992, Cassell Military Paperbacks, ISBN 0-304-35542-9. The raids did minimal damage to the runway and damage to radars was quickly repaired. Post-war propaganda"Propaganda was, of course, used later to try to justify these missions: 'The Mirage IIIs were redrawn from Southern Argentina to Buenos Aires to add to the defences there following the Vulcan raids on the islands.' Apparently the logic behind this statement was that if the Vulcan could hit Port Stanley, the Buenos Aires was well within range as well and was vulnerable to similar attacks. I never went along with that baloney. A lone Vulcan or two running in to attack Buenos Aires without fighter support would have been shot to hell in quick time."-"Mirage IIIs were in evidence near the islands on several occasions during the conflict, either escorting the Neptune reconnaissance missions or on 'interference' flights that attempted to draw CAP attention away from air-to-ground attacks."-"Suffice it to say that you didn't need more than one or two Mirage IIIs to intercept a Vulcan attack on Buenos Aires"-"It would have taken much more than a lone Vulcan raid to upset Buenos Aires" pages 247-48 in Sea Harrier over the Falklands states that the Vulcan raids influenced Argentina to withdraw Mirage IIIs from the Southern Argentina to the Buenos Aires Defence Zone. It has been suggested that the Black Buck raids were pressed home by the Royal Air ForceSir Lawrence Freedman: Official History of the Falklands Campaign, 2005. The British armed forces had been cut in the late seventies, and the RAF may have desired a greater role in the conflict to prevent further cutsA.C.G.Welburn: The Application of False Principles and the Misapplication of Valid Principles page 25 in 'Australian Defence Force Journal No. 124 May/June 1997'. A single crater was produced on the runway, rendering it impossible for the airfield to be used by fast jetsMax Hastings, Simon Jenkins: The Battle for the Falklands (1983) ISBN 0393301982, p144. Argentine ground crew repaired the runwayEdward Fursdon: Falklands Aftermath, "The Argentinians had temporarily backfilled the five large craters, enabling them to continue to fly in C-130 Hercules transports" - the other craters were from Harrier raids; note that C-130 Hercules aircraft are designed to land on very rough semi-prepared airstrips. within twenty-four hours"And what was achieved? A crater in the runway that was filled in within twenty-four hours, and possibly a 30 mm gun radar knocked out." Sea Harrier over the Falklands and produced fake craters to confound British damage assessment"The photographs showed another bomb crater on Port Stanley airfield runway. This had been created by the Argentine Air Force unit who had begun to simulate bomb craters using bulldozers to build piles of mud which could be removed at night allowing aircraft to land." 16th May 1982 in http://www.navynews.co.uk/falklands/day_may.asp. The runway was also available for MB-339 Aermacchi jetsMax Hastings:"The Battle for the Falklands" on page 203 in the San Carlos chapter (21st May):"Meanwhile, a single Aeromacchi - almost certainly the first Fleet Air Arm (Argentine COAN) reconnaissance aircraft flying from Port Stanley - attacked the....".

On 1 May operations against the Falklands opened with the "Black Buck 1" attack on the airfield at Stanley. The Vulcan had originally been designed for medium-range stand-off nuclear missions in Europe and did not have the range to fly to the Falklands, requiring several in-flight refuellings. The RAF's tanker planes were mostly converted Handley Page Victor bombers with similar range, so they too had to be refuelled in the air. Thus, a total of 11 tankers were required for only two Vulcans, a huge logistics effort, given that both the tankers and bombers had to use the same strip. The attack yielded only a single hit on the runway.

The raids, at almost 8,000 nautical miles (13 000 km) and 16 hours for the return journey, were the longest-ranged bombing raids in history at that time (surpassed in the Persian Gulf War of 1991 by United States Air Force B-52 Stratofortress flying from the continental United States but using forward-positioned tankers). They are often credited with the strategic success of causing the Argentine Air Force ("Fuerza Aerea Argentina") to withdraw all their Dassault Mirage III aircraft to protect against the possibility of similar bombing raids on the Argentine mainland. However, according to the FAA version, Group 8 Mirages were deployed to Comodoro Rivadavia and Rio Gallegos in April (before the raids) where they remained until June to protect against any Chilean threat and as reserve for the strike units. Their lack of aerial refuel capability and a smaller internal fuel capacity, as compared to the IAI Daggers, prevented them from being used effectively over the islands, as was shown by their only engagement of the war on May 1, so they were relegated to mainland duties. Concerned about the possibility of Chilean strikes or Special Air Service raids, the FAA was forced to disperse its aircraft in the areas surrounding their southern airfields. For example, several parts of the national route #3 were used for this purpose. Commodore Ruben Oscar Moro La Guerra Inaudita, 2000 ISBN 987-96007-3-8

Only minutes after the RAF's Black Buck 1, nine Fleet Air Arm BAE Sea Harrier from HMS Hermes (R12) followed up the raid by dropping BL755 cluster bombs on Stanley and the smaller grass airstrip at Goose Green. The Harriers destroyed one FMA IA 58 Pucará at Goose Green and caused minor damage to Stanley airfield infrastructure. The remaining runways were fully operational through the rest of the conflict. Other Sea Harriers had taken off from the deck of HMS Invincible (R05) for combat air patrols, and although attached BBC reporter Brian Hanrahan was forbidden to divulge the number of planes involved, he came up with the memorable phrase "I counted them all out and I counted them all back." Gordon Smith, Battle Atlas of the Falklands War 1982 by Land, Sea and Air, lulu.com, 2006, URL retrieved 21 February 2007 Correspondent profile - bbc.co.uk, undated, retrieved on 21 February 2007

The Argentines nevertheless claimed that two Sea Harriers were downed that morning in the general area of Stanley. The Commander of the 10th Mechanized Infantry Brigade, Brigadier-General Oscar Jofre, gave the serial numbers of the two Sea Harriers as XZ 458 and XZ 491. Claiming the first to a 35 mm gun and the second to a Roland missile.the claim is made in his book La Defensa de Puerto Argentino - The Argentine Fight For The Falklands, Martin Middlebrook, pp.94-95 This claim has been dismissed by a number of English language sources...all blatant lies, designed to cover up the Argentine set backs of the day - The Argentine Fight For The Falklands, Martin Middlebrook, pp.94-95the Argentine claim that two Sea Harrier were shot down ... was patently fictitious - Falklands Air War, Chris Hobson and Andrew Noble

Of the five Black Buck raids, three were against Stanley Airfield, with the other two anti-radar missions using AGM-45 Shrike Air-to-surface missile Anti-radiation missile.

Escalation of the air war BAE Sea Harrier . This aircraft's predecessor, the FRS1, participated during the conflict.

The Falklands had only three airfields. The longest and only paved runway was at the capital, Stanley, Falkland Islands, and even it was too short to support fast jets. Therefore, the Argentine Air Force (FAA) was forced to launch its major strikes from the mainland, severely hampering its efforts at forward staging, combat air patrols and close air support over the islands. The effective loiter time of incoming Argentine aircraft was low, and they were later compelled to overfly British forces in any attempt to attack the islands.

The first major Argentine strike force comprised 36 aircraft (A-4 Skyhawk, IAI Nesher, English Electric Canberra and Dassault Mirage III escorts), and was sent on 1 May, in the belief that the British invasion was imminent or landings had already taken place. Only a section of Grupo 6 (flying IAI Dagger aircraft) found ships, which were firing at Argentine defences near the islands. The Daggers managed to attack the ships and return safely. This greatly boosted morale of the Argentine pilots, who now knew they could survive an attack against modern warships, protected by radar ground clutter from the Islands and by using a late pop-up profile.

Meanwhile, other Argentine aircraft were intercepted by Sea Harriers operating from HMS Invincible (R05). A Dagger and a Canberra were shot down.

Mirage IIIEA. Their lack of aerial refuelling capability prevented them from being used effectively over the islands in the air-air role.Combat broke out between Sea Harrier FRS Mk 1 fighters of No. 801 Naval Air Squadron and Dassault Mirage III fighters of Grupo 8. Both sides refused to fight at the other's best altitude, until two Mirages finally descended to engage. One was shot down by an AIM-9 air-to-air missile (AAM), while the other escaped but without enough fuel to return to its mainland airfield. The plane made for Stanley, where it fell victim to friendly fire from the Argentine defenders.

As a result of this experience, Argentine Air Force staff decided to employ A-4 Skyhawks and Daggers only as strike units, the Canberras only during the night, and Mirage IIIs (without air refuelling capability or any capable AAM) as decoys to lure away the British Sea Harriers. The decoying would be later extended with the formation of the Escuadron Fenix, a squadron of civilian jets flying 24 hours-a-day simulating strike aircraft preparing to attack the fleet. On one of these flights, an Air Force Learjet was shot down, killing the squadron commander, Vice Commodore Rodolfo De La Colina, who was the highest-ranking Argentine officer to die in the War.

Stanley was used as an Argentine strongpoint throughout the conflict. Despite the Black Buck and Harrier raids on Stanley airfield (no fast jets were stationed there for air defence) and overnight shelling by detached ships, it was never out of action entirely. Stanley was defended by a mixture of Surface-to-air missile (SAM) systems such as the Franco-German Roland (air defence)) and Swiss-built 35 mm twin anti-aircraft cannons. C-130 Hercules transport night flights brought supplies, weapons, vehicles, and fuel, and airlifted out the wounded up until the end of the conflict. The few RN Sea Harriers were considered too valuable by day to risk in night-time blockade operations, and their Blue Fox radar was not an effective look-down over land radar. The only Argentine Air Force Hercules shot down by the British was lost on 1 June when TC-63 was intercepted by a Sea Harrier in daylight when it was searching for the British fleet north-east of the islands after the Argentine Navy retired its last P-2 Neptune due to airframe attrition.

Sinking of Belgrano

Two separate British naval task forces (surface vessels and submarines) and the Argentine fleet were operating in the neighbourhood of the Falklands, and soon came into conflict. The first naval loss was the World War II vintage Argentine light cruiser ARA General Belgrano — formerly the USS Phoenix (CL-46), a survivor of the 1941 attack on Pearl Harbor. The Nuclear power submarine HMS Conqueror (S48), captained by Commander Christopher Wreford-Brown, sank Belgrano on May 2 using List of torpedoes torpedoes of WWII-vintage design; these were chosen as they carried a larger warhead and contact fuses and there were worries surrounding the reliability of the newer Mk 24 torpedo stock. Three hundred and twenty-three members of Belgrano's crew died in the incident. Over 700 men were rescued from the open ocean despite cold seas and stormy weather. Losses from Belgrano totalled just over half of Argentine deaths in the Falklands conflict, and the Belgrano remains the only ship ever sunk by a nuclear submarine in combat.

In a separate incident later that night, British forces engaged an Argentine patrol gunboat, the USS Salish (ATA-187). At the time, the Alferez Sobral was searching for the crew of the Argentine Air Force English Electric Canberra light bomber shot down on May 1. Two Westland Lynxes fired four Sea Skua missiles against her. Badly damaged and with eight crew dead, the Sobral managed to return to Puerto Deseado two days later, but the Canberra's crew were never found.

Initial reports conflated the two incidents, contributing to confusion about the number of casualties and the identity of the vessel that sank. The Rupert Murdoch-owned British tabloid newspaper The Sun (newspaper) greeted the initial reports of the attack with the headline "GOTCHA". This first edition was published before news was known that the Belgrano had actually sunk (reporting instead, erroneously, that the gunboat had sunk) and carried no reports of actual Argentine deaths. The headline was replaced in later editions by the more tempered "Did 1,200 Argies drown?".

The loss of ARA General Belgrano hardened the stance of the Argentine government and also became a cause célèbre for anti-war campaigners (such as Labour MP Tam Dalyell), who declared that the ship had been sailing away from the Falklands at the time. The vessel was outside the exclusion zone, and sailing away from the area of conflict. However, during war, under international law, the heading of a belligerent naval vessel has no bearing on its status. In addition, the captain of the Belgrano, Hector Bonzo, has testified that the attack was legitimate.http://news.independent.co.uk/uk/politics/story.jsp?story=476472http://www.ladlass.com/intel/archives/006479.html In later years it has been claimed that the information on the position of the ARA General Belgrano came from a Soviet spy satellite which was tapped by the Military of Norway intelligence service station at Fauske, Norway, and then handed over to the British. However, Conqueror had been shadowing the Belgrano for some days, so this extra information would have been unnecessary.http://www.nrk.no/programmer/tv/brennpunkt/1861285.html article about the Fauske II station (in Norwegian)

The sinking occurred 14 hours after List of Presidents of Peru Fernando Belaúnde Terry had proposed a comprehensive peace plan and called for regional unity. With the comprehensive failure of diplomatic efforts to that point and so without any hope that additional diplomatic efforts would lead anywhere, and with the knowledge that the delay that would be incurred by such efforts would eliminate the military option due to the closing winter weather, this plan was not entertained by the UK.

Regardless of controversies over the sinking, it had a crucial strategic effect: the elimination of the Argentine naval threat. After her loss, the entire Argentine fleet returned to port and did not leave again for the duration of hostilities. The two escorting destroyers and the battle group centred on the aircraft carrier ARA Veinticinco de Mayo both withdrew from the area, ending the direct threat to the British fleet that their pincer movement had represented. The attack on Belgrano was the first kill made by a nuclear submarine and only the second submarine kill since the end of the World War II, the other being made by PNS Hangor, a diesel electric submarine during the Indo-Pakistan War of 1971.

British historian Sir Lawrence Freedman stated in the second volume of his Official History of the Falklands that intelligence about the Belgrano did not reach senior British commanders and politicians until the order to sink her was passed. Thatcher in dark on Belgrano sinking Commander Christopher Wreford-Brown, commanding officer of HMS Conqueror, informed the Admiralty four hours before his attack that the Argentine cruiser had changed course, but this information was not passed to the Ministry of Defence (United Kingdom) or Rear-Admiral John “Sandy” Woodward (commander of the RN task force). However, as Admiral Woodward later stated, the Belgrano's course and speed at the time she was sunk were irrelevant - from a strategic point of view, only her position and capabilities mattered.

Sinking of HMS Sheffield of the Argentine Navy.

Two days after the sinking of Belgrano, on May 2, the British lost the Type 42 destroyer HMS Sheffield (D80) to fire following an Exocet missile strike. Sheffield had been ordered forward with two other Type 42s in order to provide a long-range radar and medium-high altitude missile "picket" far from the British carriers. After the ships were detected by an Argentine Navy P-2 Neptune patrol aircraft, two Dassault Super Étendards (serial no. 202 and 203) were launched from their base at Río Grande, Tierra del Fuego, each armed with a single Exocet AM39 missile. Refuelled by an Argentine Air Force C-130 Hercules after launch, they went in at low altitude, popped up for a radar check at 50 miles (80 km) and released the missiles from 20 to 30 miles (30 to 50 km) away.

HMS Glasgow, Sheffield’s sister ship and the northernmost of the three-destroyer picket, detected the two Étendards on their first pop-up, and warned the fleet-wide anti-air warfare coordinator in Hermes. Hermes dismissed the report as one of the many false alarms already that morning. Glasgow continued to monitor that bearing and detected the second pop-up, and this time the tell-tale Exocet seeker radar via the ship's electronic warfare support measures equipment. Again Hermes ruled the detection as spurious, but Glasgow continued to broadcast handbrake, the codeword for Exocet radar detected.

The first missile missed HMS Yarmouth (F101), due to her deployment of Chaff (radar countermeasure) in response to the warning, whilst Glasgow repeatedly tried, without success, to engage the other with Sea Dart missiles. Still Hermes ruled that this was a false alarm.

Sheffield was unable to detect directly the seeker radar as, in a case of bad timing, the SCOT satellite communications terminal was in use which deafened the onboard electronic warfare support measures (ESM) equipment. She did not detect the missile on radar due to her radar being of a similar frequency to that of the Exocet. It is not known why she did not respond to Glasgow's warnings, but no chaff was fired and a shipwide warning of attack went out only seconds before impact when a watchkeeper (Lieutenant Commander Peter Walpole) identified rocket trails visually.

Sheffield was struck amidships, with devastating effect. Whether the warhead actually exploded is debated, but raging fires started to spread, ultimately killing 20 crew members and severely injuring 24 others. Whilst alongside rendering assistance, Yarmouth repeatedly broke off to fire anti-submarine weaponry in response to Sonar reports of torpedoes in the water (later believed to have been a misdiagnosis of the outboard motor of the small inflatables helping with firefighting), as well as visual reports of torpedoes (in actual fact the Sheffield was ridding herself of torpedoes to prevent explosion).

Sheffield was abandoned several hours later, gutted and deformed by the fires that continued to burn for six more days. She finally sank outside the Maritime Exclusion Zone on May 10, whilst under tow from Yarmouth, becoming an official war grave. In one sense Sheffield served her purpose as a part of the missile picket line — she took the missile instead of the aircraft carriers.

The tempo of operations increased throughout the second half of May as United Nations attempts to mediate a peace were rejected by the British, who felt that any delay would make a campaign impractical in the South Atlantic storms. The destruction of Sheffield had a profound impact on the British public, bringing home the fact that the "Falklands Crisis", as the BBC News put it, was now an actual 'shooting war'.

SAS operations

Given the threat to the British fleet posed by the Etendard / Exocet combination, plans were made to use Special Air Service troops to attack the home base of the five Etendards at Río Grande, Tierra del Fuego. The aim was to destroy the missiles and the aircraft that carried them, and to kill the pilots in their quarters. Two plans were drafted and underwent preliminary rehearsal: a landing by approximately fifty-five SAS in two C-130 Hercules aircraft directly on the runway at Rio Grande; and infiltration of twenty-four SAS by inflatable boats brought within a few miles of the coast by submarine. Neither plan was implemented; the earlier airborne assault plan attracted considerable hostility from some members of the SAS, who considered the proposed raid a suicide mission.telegraph.co.uk SAS 'suicide mission' to wipe out Exocets Ironically, the Rio Grande area would be defended by four full-strength battalions of Marine Infantry of the Argentine Marine Corps of the Argentine Navy, some of whose officers were trained in the UK by Special Boat Service years earlier.Middlebrook, The Argentine Fight for the Falklnds p. 75After the war, Argentine marine commanders admitted that they were waiting for some kind of landing by SAS forces but never expected a Hercules to land directly on their runways, although they would have pursued British forces even into Chilean territory if they were attacked.La Infantería de Marina de la Armada Argentina en el Conflicto del Atlántico Sur, ISBN 987-433-641-2

A SAS reconnaissance team was dispatched to carry out preparations for a seaborne infiltration. A Westland Sea King helicopter carrying the assigned team took off from HMS Invincible on the night of May 17, but bad weather forced it to land 50 miles (80 km) from its target, and the mission was aborted.http://www.timesonline.co.uk/newspaper/0,,170-1670775,00.html The pilot flew to Chile and dropped off the SAS team, before setting fire to his helicopter and surrendering to the Chilean authorities. The discovery of the burnt-out helicopter attracted considerable international attention at the time.

On May 14, the SAS carried out the raid on Pebble Island at the Falklands, where the Argentine Navy had taken over a grass airfield for FMA IA 58 Pucará light ground attack aircraft and T-34 Mentors. The raid destroyed the aircraft there.

Landing at San Carlos — Bomb Alley

During the night on May 21, the British Amphibious Task Group under the command of Commodore Michael Clapp landed on beaches around San Carlos Water, on the northwestern coast of East Falkland facing onto Falkland Sound. The bay, known as Bomb Alley by British forces, was the scene of repeated air attacks by low-flying Argentine jets. Bomb Alley — Falklands Island 1982. Charles ends Falklands tour on sombre note, BBC News.

The 4,000 men of 3 Commando Brigade were put ashore as follows: 2nd battalion of the Parachute Regiment (2 Para) from the RORO ferry Norland and 40 Commando (Royal Marines) from the amphibious ship HMS Fearless (L10) were landed at San Carlos (Blue Beach), 3 Para from the amphibious ship HMS Intrepid (L11) were landed at Port San Carlos (Green Beach) and 45 Commando from RFA Stromness (A344) were landed at Ajax Bay (Red Beach). Notably the waves of 8 Landing Craft Utilitys and 8 LCVPs were led by Major Ewen Southby-Tailyour who had commanded the Falklands detachment only a year previously. 42 Commando on the liner SS Canberra was a tactical reserve. Units from the Royal Artillery, Royal Engineers etc. and tanks were also put ashore with the landing craft, the Round Table class landing ship logistics Landing Ship Logistics and mexefloat barges. Rapier missile launchers were carried as underslung loads of Westland Sea Kings for rapid deployment.


By dawn the next day they had established a secure beachhead from which to conduct offensive operations. From there Julian Thompson's plan was to capture Darwin, Falkland Islands and Goose Green before turning towards Port Stanley.Now, with the British troops on the ground, the Argentine Air Force began the night bombing campaign against them using English Electric Canberra bomber planes until the last day of the war (June 14).

At sea, the paucity of the British ships' anti-aircraft defences was demonstrated in the sinking of HMS Ardent (F184) on May 21, HMS Antelope (F170) on May 21, and MV Atlantic Conveyor, with a vital cargo of helicopters, runway-building equipment and tents on May 25. The loss of all but one of the RAF Chinook helicopters being carried by the Atlantic Conveyor was a severe blow from a logistics perspective. Also lost on this day was HMS Coventry (D118), a sister to HMS Sheffield (D80), whilst in company with HMS Broadsword (F88) after being ordered to act as decoy to draw away Argentinian aircraft from other ships at San Carlos Bay.Captain Hart Dyke, Commanding Officer of HMS Coventry HMS Argonaut (F56) and HMS Brilliant (F90) were badly damaged. However, many British ships escaped terminal damage because of the Argentine pilots' bombing tactics. In order to avoid the highest concentration of British air defences, Argentine pilots were forced to release ordnance from very low altitude, consequently their bomb fuses did not have time to arm before impact.

A-4C A-4 Skyhawk flying to the islands. Notice the 1000 lb General-purpose bomb

While the attacks were undoubtedly brave, the low release of the unretarded General-purpose bomb (some of which were sold to the Argentine FAA by the British years earlier) meant that many never exploded as there was insufficient time in the air for them to arm themselves. Simple free-fall bombs will, at low altitude, impact almost directly below the dropping aircraft, therefore there is a minimum safe altitude for release. The pilots would doubtless have been aware of this, but in the heat of Bomb Alley (the pilots need to avoid a high concentration of anti-aircraft defences of SAMs and Anti-Aircraft Artillery plus the Sea Harriers' CAPs) many failed to climb to the necessary release point. The problem was solved by the improvised fitting of Gravity bomb, allowing low-level bombing attacks as employed on June 8.

In his autobiographical account of the Falklands War, Admiral Woodward blames the BBC World Service for these changes to the bombs. The World Service reported the lack of detonations after receiving a briefing on the matter from an Ministry of Defence (United Kingdom) official. He describes the BBC as being more concerned with being "fearless seekers after truth" than with the lives of British servicemen. Colonel H. Jones levelled similar accusations against the BBC after they disclosed the impending British attack on Goose Green by The Parachute Regiment. Jones had threatened to lead the prosecution of senior BBC officials for treason but was unable to do so since he was himself killed in action around Goose Green.

Thirteen bombs Battle Atlas of the Falklands War 1982 — British ships lost & damaged. hit British ships without detonating. David Craig, Baron Craig of Radley, the former Marshal of the Royal Air Force, is said to have remarked: “Six better fuses and we would have lost” Scotsman. although Ardent and Antelope were both lost despite the failure of bombs to explode. The fuses were functioning correctly, and the bombs were simply released from too low an altitude. Royal Navy.

The Argentines lost nearly twenty aircraft in these attacks.

Battle of Goose Green From early on 27 May until 28 May, 2 Para, (approximately 500 men) with Artillery support from 8 Alma Cdo Bty, approached and attacked Darwin, Falkland Islands and Goose Green, which was held by the Argentine 12th Inf Regt. After a tough struggle which lasted all night and into the next day, 17 British and 55 Argentine soldiers had been killed, and 1,050 Argentine troops (including around 350 FAA non-combatant personnel of the Condor airfield Commodore Ruben Oscar Moro La Guerra Inaudita, 2000 ISBN 987-96007-3-8) taken prisoner. The BBC announced the taking of Goose Green on the BBC World Service before it had actually happened. It was during this attack that Lieutenant Colonel H. Jones, the commanding officer of 2 Para was killed. He was posthumously awarded the Victoria Cross.



With the sizeable Argentine force at Goose Green out of the way, British forces were now able to break out of the San Carlos, Falkland Islands bridgehead. On 27 May, men of 45 Cdo and 3 Para started walking across East Falkland towards the coastal settlement of Teal Inlet.

Special forces on Mount Kent Meanwhile, 42 Commando prepared to move by helicopter to Mount Kent. Unknown to senior British officers, the Argentine generals were determined to tie down the British troops in the Mount Kent area, and on 27 May and 28 May they sent transport aircraft loaded with Blowpipe surface-to-air missiles and commandos (602nd Commando Company and 601st National Gendarmerie Special Forces Squadron) to Stanley, Falkland Islands. This operation was known as Operation AUTOIMPUESTA (Self-Determination-Initiative). For the next week, the Special Air Service (SAS) and Mountain Leader Training Cadre of 3 Commando Brigade waged intense patrol battles with patrols of the volunteers' 602nd Commando Company under Major Aldo Rico, normally 2IC of the 22nd Mountain Infantry Regiment. Throughout 30 May, Royal Air Force Harriers were active over Mount Kent. One of them — Harrier XZ 963 flown by Squadron-Leader Jerry Pook — in responding to a call for help from D Squadron, attacked Mount Kent's eastern lower slopes, and that led to its loss through small-arms fire.

On the 31 May, the Royal Marines Mountain Leader Training Cadre (M&AWC) defeated Argentine Special Forces at the Battle of Top Malo House. A 13-strong Argentine Army Commando detachment (Captain Jose Vercesi's 1st Assault Section, 602nd Commando Company) found itself trapped in a small shepherd's house at Top Malo. The Argentine commandos fired from windows and doorways and then took refuge in a stream bed from the burning house. Completely surrounded, they fought 19 M&AWC marines under Captain Rod Boswell for forty-five minutes until, with their ammunition almost exhausted, they elected to surrender. Three Cadre members were badly wounded. On the Argentine side there were two dead including Lieutenant Ernesto Espinoza and Sergeant Mateo Sbert (who were decorated for their bravery). Only five Argentines were left unscathed. As the British mopped up Top Malo House, down from Malo Hill came Lieutenant Fraser Haddow's M&AWC patrol, brandishing a large Union Flag. One wounded Argentine soldier, Lieutenant Horacio Losito, commented that their escape route would have taken them through Haddow's position.

It is estimated that 40 Argentine Commandos were involved in the battle with the SAS and the Cadre at Top Malo House and Mount Kent. A body count revealed four bullet-ridden Argentine Army 602nd Commando Company killed in the firefights. Seven members of the British Special Forces were wounded during these actions. One Special Boat Service sergeant was killed in a blue on blue engagement by an SAS patrol.

Major Mario Castagneto's commanding the 601st Commando Company attempted to move forward on their Kawasaki motorbikes and commandeered Land Rover Series to rescue 602nd Commando Company on Estancia Mountain. Spotted by 42 Commando of the Royal Marines, they were engaged with L16 81 mm Mortar and forced to withdraw to Two Sisters mountain. Captain Eduardo Villarruel on Estancia Mountain realised his position had become untenable and after conferring with fellow officers ordered a withdrawal. David Aldea, The Argentine Commandos on Mount Kent

The Argentine operation also saw the extensive use of helicopter support to position and extract patrols; the Argentine Army 601st Combat Aviation Battalion also suffered casualties. At about 11.00 a.m. on 30 May, an Aérospatiale Puma helicopter was brought down by a shoulder-launched stinger missile surface-to-air missile (SAM) fired by the Special air service in the vicinity of Mount Kent in which six Gendarmeria Nacional Argentina Special Forces were killed and eight more wounded in the crash.

As Brigadier Julian Thompson commented, "It was fortunate that I had ignored the views expressed by Northwood that reconnaissance of Mount Kent before insertion of 42 Commando was superfluous. Had D Squadron not been there, the Argentine Special Forces would have caught the Commando before deplaning and, in the darkness and confusion on a strange landing zone, inflicted heavy casualties on men and helicopters."Julian Thompson, No Picnic, p. 93, Casssell & Co, 2001

Bluff Cove and Fitzroy By June 1, with the arrival of a further 5,000 British troops of the 5th Infantry Brigade, the new British divisional commander, Major General Jeremy Moore RM, had sufficient force to start planning an offensive against Stanley, Falkland Islands.

During this build-up, the Argentine air assaults on the British naval forces continued, killing 56. 32 of the dead were from the Welsh Guards on RFA Sir Galahad (1966) and RFA Sir Tristram (L3505) on June 8. According to Surgeon-Commander Rick Jolly of the Falklands Field Hospital, more than 150 men suffered burns and injuries of some kind in the attack, including, famously, Simon Weston.Rick Jolly, The Red & Green Life Machine, page 124

The Guards were sent to support a dashing advance along the southern approach to Stanley. On 2 June, a small advance party of 2 Para moved to Swan Inlet house in a number of Army Westland Scout helicopters. Telephoning ahead to Fitzroy, they discovered the area clear of Argentines and (exceeding their authority) commandeered the one remaining RAF Chinook helicopter to frantically ferry another contingent of 2 Para ahead to Fitzroy, Falkland Islands (a settlement on Port Pleasant) and Bluff Cove (a settlement confusingly, and perhaps ultimately fatally, on Port Fitzroy).

This un-coordinated advance caused planning nightmares for the commanders of the combined operation, as they now found themselves with a 30 mile (48 km) string of indefensible positions on their southern flank. Support could not be sent by air as the single remaining Chinook was already heavily oversubscribed. The soldiers could march, but their equipment and heavy supplies would need to be ferried by sea. Plans were drawn up for half the Welsh Guards to march light on the night of 2 June, whilst the Scots Guards and the second half of the Welsh Guards were to be ferried from San Carlos Water in the Landing Ship Logistics (LSL) Sir Tristram and the

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